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The British formed their military tradition a long time ago, and their superiority in battle must be, and is, conceded by Atkinson. Patton's gift is, like Grant's, the ability to see that war is all about killing and to brutally and single-mindedly lead officers and men into taking the murderous offensive. But of course, they lack the resources to win the war themselves, and the story that Atkinson begins to tell in this volume is the shift in the staffing and leadership of the war from the British to the Americans. This book deserved the Pulitzer Prize, and I look forward to reading to next volume. Atkinson in unsparing in his criticism of the initial deficiencies of the American fighting man and commander. This is a truly great work of narrative history, combining thorough research, balanced analysis, and excellent writing. I was skeptical at first as to the need for a full length history on a minor theater of battle, particularly when one considers the hundreds of divisions and millions of casaulties occurring on the Eastern Front at this very time. Much of the appeal of this book lies in how well Atkinson portrays the transformation from likable amateur to cold-blooded killer.
But Eisenhower's ability to learn from his mistakes and his charm come through, and one does feel a patriotic glow at the sight of these wonderfully American characteristics. But Atkinson does highlight Patton's neglect of logistics as well as his sometimes puzzling lack of strategic imagination. The British criticism is that the Americans are always looking for the easy way out of overwhelming the enemy with superior resources, and perhaps in the process we have neglected getting the most out of each individual soldier. Scott's portrayal of him was not far off the mark. The description of the critical battle of Kasserine Pass, perhaps the worst defeat of American troops since 1812, is excellent. On the other hand, the insufferable Montgomery and the infuriating condescension of the British are justly criticized by Atkinson.The description of Patton is priceless and, based on this book, George C. But Atkinson is setting out to write the history of the development of a superior American military tradition that is critical for understanding world history in the second half of the twentieth century.
Still, even today (particularly in Iraq), the British do tend to outperform the Americans, man-for-man, and the reasons for this are not entirely clear to me. Eisenhower's deficiencies are laid out for all to see -- the stupidity of holding vulnerable ground for the sake of holding ground; the failure to coordinate air support; the bad choice of subordinate commanders; the weakness in the face of British condescension; and the focus on politics. These guys are truly not ready for prime time, but one does learn quickly in war. What was new for me was not the deficiences of the soldiers but the bone-headed strategic calls of the commanders, including Eisenhower.
This is a better book than the second book in the trilogy. Since this is mainly about American efforts, the minor portions devoted to the extensive British operations in North Arica are understandable. This is a superior, concise telling of Operation Torch and the aftermath. Told in an easy, conversational style, the weakness and strengths of the first major blooding of US forces on the offensive in Europe are well portrayed.
It is hard to keep the overall tactical and strategic picture in mind while reading. This is a very thorough and well researched book. This was not the case in this story. A good military history weaves the small unit action together with the big picture and keeps a level of excitement and tension throughout. However, it lacks cohesion. I found it to be boring at many stretches.
I read a while and then went on to other things, but always came back. Unlike many other reviewers, I couldn't do this in a single stretch. Or take a break to absorb so much detail.
One of the gifts of this book is the close examination of the learning curve suffered by the US troops as they made, and then learned from, grievous mistakes. A suggestion about reading this book - this is a lot of information to process and a lot of action to take in. Rick Atkinson has pulled off a well-organized and very personal account of the entry of the United States into World War II via North Africa.
Sometimes it is a good idea to follow a single thread of interest throughout the book using the excellent index. This is the first book in Atkinson's "Liberation Trilogy" and I've already acquired and am anticipating the second book, "The Day of Battle". And, without resorting to petty gossip, he paints a very clear picture of the leadership on all sides of the action with an eye toward understanding the source of each man's drive and motivation.The extensive battle maps in this book are indispensable.
Unfortunately, the grayscale on some of the maps makes the participants hard to distinguish (e.g., in grayscale, the flags of France and Italy are identical).
Army, with enormous advantages in supply and materiel, to pound his African forces to a pulp. Why. viewpoint, the next steps led to Italy, where excellent defensive terrain would now be on their side, not ours. What was Rommel thinking - would he push on to U.S.
However, as a key example, the tactical defeat at Kasserine was also a strategic victory for the U.S. From the U.S. I enjoyed this book and recommend it strongly. My comments deal with a relative lack of strategic analysis in hindsight. The optimum strategic result for the Allies was for the Germans to reinforce Tunisia, from where very few combatants would ever return. After overwhelming an inferior American infantry force and tank destroyer force at Kasserine they pushed aggressively north and west, until they encountered powerful American artillery units, well supplied with 105 mm munitions, and could go no further.
This game, arguably, should have been played to the end (rather than to "Victory"), until Hitler refused further support for his trapped African army. bases in Algeria and Morocco, with ever longer supply lines. A common element: the powerful American artillery units that saved our forces in Africa were as nothing to the massed Soviet artillery that defended Kursk (Operation Zitadelle).Atkinson has in my mind assumed the objective was to conquer Tunis as quickly as possible - conventional military thinking. But Hitler's obsession with not losing ground created the perfect opportunity for the U.S. This would take pressure off the Soviets in the short term and off the Normandy invasion in the longer term. This strategy is a hidden assumption in his analysis, as he regrets the near miss in not capturing Tunis in a brief window of opportunity in late 1942. There is a very thorough discussion of why North Africa was an optimum initial target for the US Army, which is eminently supportable.
Had he learned nothing from becoming overextended on the borders of Egypt, which was far harder for the Allies to support.More importantly, had the Germans learned nothing from their Russian campaigns of 1941 and 1942, where they initially trounced weak Soviet units but pushed on against a defense in depth with ever diminishing returns. They took the bait. and a strategic blunder for Germany. Therefore drawing the Germans into a wasteful offensive was the bait.
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